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Abstract  
In this article we describe our ongoing research to investigate the impact RIJHRJUDSK\RQILUPV¶ORFDWLRQ
decisions. This work allows us to comment on a key current policy debate, by assessing whether 
independent control over corporation tax offers an effective lever for a nation (e.g. Scotland) to offset 
aspects of geographic disadvantage when competing against other nations within Europe to attract 
foreign direct inward investment. 
1. Introduction 
In this article we summarise some key findings from our ongoing research into how natural geography 
influences the success of nations competing to attract firms into a supranational region.   
Our analysis is based on a stylised model designed to capture two key features of natural geography:  
the relative size and centrality of nations. We initially assume that corporation tax is the same in each 
QDWLRQ DQG JDLQ LQVLJKWV RQ KRZ WKHVH NH\ IHDWXUHV RI QDWXUDO JHRJUDSK\ LPSDFW RQ ILUPV¶ ORFDWLRQ
GHFLVLRQV:HWKHQUHYLHZWKH8.*RYHUQPHQW¶VUHFHQWFKDQJHVLQFRUSRUDWLRQWD[ZKLFKLWYLHZVDVD
key element of its growth strategy. We also reviHZWKHPRWLYDWLRQIRUWKH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶VGHVLUHWR
reduce the rate of corporation tax in Scotland to below the unified UK rate.  
Within the context of our model we then explain how we can assess whether independent control over 
corporation tax offers an effective lever for a nation to offset aspects of geographic disadvantage when 
competing to attract inward foreign direct investment to a supra-national region. We show that lower 
corporation taxes do have the potential to attract additional inward investment and mitigate the 
geographic disadvantage of being a relatively small nation on the periphery of a large multi-state region. 
In addition,  even if the governments of other nations respond to such a tax cut,  their responses do not 
fully match the iQLWLDOFXWWKHUHE\OLPLWLQJWKHµUDFHWRWKHERWWRP¶HIIHFW 
,Q VHFWLRQ  ZH H[SODLQ WKH NH\ IHDWXUHV RI RXU VW\OLVHG PRGHO DQG FKDUDFWHULVH KRZ ILUPV¶ ORFDWLRQ
decisions are made. Section 3 summarises our findings on how natural geography impacts on the 
distribution of firms across nations. In section 4 we contrast recent UK policy on corporation tax with the 
6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶VGHVLUHWRWDNHFRQWURORIDQGUHGXFH WKHUDWHRIFRUSRUDWLRQWD[ LQ6FRWODQG ,Q
section 5 we explain how we use the model to gain insights on whether independent control over 
corporation tax offers an effective lever for a nation to offset aspects of geographic disadvantage when 
competing to attract inward foreign direct investment. Section 6 concludes.  
 
 
 
2. Key features of our stylised model 
Our stylised model involves just three nations that together comprise a supranational free trade region.  
Natural geography: 
The first aspect of natural geography incorporated into the model is the size of each nation. From the 
perspective of the firms coming into the region and setting up a production plant, the size of the nation 
WKH\FKRRVHPDWWHUVVLQFHWKDWQDWLRQ¶VFRQVXPHUVFRQVWLWXWHWKHLUORFDOPDUNHWDODUJHUQDWLRQKDVPRUH
consumers, so providing a larger local market for the fiUPV¶SURGXFWLRQ 
Centrality and the costs of exporting:  
The second aspect of natural geography incorporated into our model is the centrality of each nation. 
Centrality matters because firms incur additional costs when they export goods to the other nations 
within the free trade region. These additional costs incurred when exporting involve shipping costs as 
well as any associated administrative costs, but we assume that they are not prohibitive, so that each 
firm choosing to locate within a given nation will still choose to sell both in the market of its host nation 
and export to the other nations throughout the free trade region. However, it is reasonable to assume 
WKDWWKHFRVWVRIH[SRUWLQJZLOOEHKLJKHUWKHJUHDWHUWKHQXPEHURIQDWLRQDOERUGHUVFURVVHGE\WKHILUP¶V
exports en-route to their final destination.  
:HFDSWXUH WKHVH IHDWXUHVZLWKLQRXUPRGHO WKURXJKFKDUDFWHULVLQJRQHRI WKH WKUHHQDWLRQVDVD µKXE¶
with the other two nations located in spoke positions. The additional costs incurred through exporting will 
be lowest for firms choosing to locate in WKH KXE QDWLRQ VLQFH WKHVH ILUPV¶ H[SRUWV FDQ UHDFK WKHLU
destination by crossing just one national border. The exports of firms choosing to locate in the spoke 
nations can reach the hub nation by crossing one border, but when the two spoke nations trade with 
each other their exports first cross the border to the hub then travel onwards and cross a second border, 
that between the hub and their final destination. The costs incurred by firms that export from one spoke 
nation to the other are therefore higher than the costs incurred by firms exporting from hub to spoke or 
spoke to hub. Note that even if it is in principle possible for firms located in either of the spokes to ship 
goods directly to the other without going through the hub, our logic holds provided the costs incurred 
through shipping direct exceed those of going through the hub.  
This model seems justified, since it is consistent with available evidence. For example, Scottish 
*RYHUQPHQWUHSRUWVWKDWRLOH[SRUWV³DUHSLSHGWR(QJODQGRUYLD(QJODQGWR&RQWLQHQWDO(XURSH´
SZKLOH³PXFKRIWKHZKLVN\GHVWLQHGIRU(XURSHDQFRQVXPSWLRQLVWUDQVSRUWHGE\URDGWRFURVVWKH
&KDQQHODW'RYHUSDQGLQWKHFDVHRIILVK³VLJQLILFDQWURDGIUHLJKWPRYHPHQW«LVWRWKHVRXWKRI
England beforHEHLQJWUDQVSRUWHGWRPDLQODQG(XURSHIRUGLVWULEXWLRQDURXQGWKH:RUOG´S 
A visual representation of these features of size, centrality and trade costs for a stylised three nation 
region is provided in Figure 1 below. From the perspective of Scotland and the rest of the EU, England is 
a central hub through which all shipments of goods must pass. Scotland and the rest of the EU 
respectively are spoke locations of very different sizes. 
  
Figure 1: Natural Geography 
 
 
)LUPV¶ORFDWLRQGHFLVLRQV 
We consider the location decisions of a fixed number of companies, currently located outside the 
supranational free trade region, each of which has decided to set up a firm (a production facility) within 
the region. We assume that each firm faces identical fixed costs of setting up a production facility 
whichever nation it chooses. We further assume that these fixed costs are sufficiently large to ensure 
that each company will set up, at most, one production facility within the region1.  
We assume that firms are able to segment the national markets, choosing how much to sell in each. The 
greater the number of firms attracted to produce within a nation, the more intense the competition. 
Greater competition drives down consumer prices. There are likely to be broader benefits of attracting 
inward foreign direct investment in the form of net new jobs (reduced involuntary unemployment), wage 
premia relative to indigenous firms and technological spillovers to local firms. 
Firms make the location choice that maximises their total after-tax operating profits. That is, they 
compare the profits they would expect to achieve if they were to locate in each individual nation, then 
choose the most profitable location. The equilibrium allocation of firms across nations will satisfy the 
condition that post-tax profits of all firms within the region are equalised.  
 
 
 
                                                     
1
 Note that by assuming that each company only locates a production facility in one nation we abstract from issues 
that have attracted a lot of attention in relation to profit shifting and compliance costs.  
3. ,QVLJKWVRQWKHLPSDFWRIQDWXUDOJHRJUDSK\RQILUPV¶ORFDWLRQGHFLVLRQV 
Consistent with previous research, we show that when there are no differences in corporation taxes 
across nations within the supra-national region, size matters: larger nations are able to attract more 
firms.     
The hub and spoke nature of our model, along with the costs associated with exporting, allow us to gain 
new insights on the influence centrDOLW\RQILUPV¶ORFDWLRQV6ROYLQJWKHPRGHOIRUILUPV¶ORFDWLRQFKRLFHV
XQGHUWKHDVVXPSWLRQWKDWHDFKQDWLRQKDVDQHTXDOVKDUHRIWKHUHJLRQ¶VSRSXODWLRQGHPRQVWUDWHVWKDW
the proportion of firms that then choose to locate in the hub nation is substantially greater than the 
proportions locating in either spoke.  
The existence of these costs incurred through exporting mean that exporting firms will sell a lower 
quantity in a given external nation than firms that chose to set up production within that nation. 
The interaction of the influences of size and centrality can be clarified further by solving the model after 
reallocating a proportion of the population from the hub nation to one of the spokes. Since both spoke 
nations gain in size relative to the hub, they both attract more of the firms while the hub attracts fewer. As 
would be expected, the nation that gains in size in both relative and absolute terms attracts 
proportionately more investment. So, while centrality of a nation within the free trade region confers an 
advantage in attracting inward investment to a large hub nation, this can be offset by the size 
disadvantage of locating in a small hub. Furthermore, reallocating a proportion of the population from a 
spoke to the hub illustrates the disadvantage of being a relatively small nation on the periphery of a free 
trade region in attracting inward investment.  
4. Corporation tax: and the contrasting views of the UK and Scottish Governments 
The current UK Government sees corporation tax as a key elemHQWLQ³FUHDWLQJWKHULJKWHQYLURQPHQWIRU
EXVLQHVVHV WR LQYHVW H[SRUW DQG JURZ´ +0 7UHDVXU\  S 6XFFHVVLYH UHGXFWLRQV LQ WKH UDWH RI
corporation tax are at the heart of its growth strategy. It has followed through on its five year plan, first 
announced in 2010, to implement year-on-year cuts in the rate of corporate tax rate from 28 percent in 
2010-11 to 21 percent in April 2014. In the March 2014 budget, the Chancellor announced that the 
unified UK corporation tax rate will reach 20 percent, the joint lowest rate in the G20.  
However, corporation tax currently remains a reserved power and successive UK governments have, so 
far, been opposed to setting (or indeed allowing) differential rates across the devolved nations.  
Meanwhile, the current Scottish Government has long argued that it would like to set a rate of 
corporation tax below that in the rest of the UK and this is reflected in various Scottish Government 
policy documents. At least in part, its reasoning is based on the argument that hubs (such as London 
and the South East of England) have in-built competitive advantages that derive from their natural 
geography, and that reducing corporation tax in Scotland is one appropriate lever to help redress this:  
 ³D XQLILHG 8. UDWH RI FRUSRUDWH WD[ LV QHLWKHU GHVLUDEOH QRU HFRQRPLFDOO\ HIILFLHQW « *LYHQ WKH
FRPSHWLWLYHDGYDQWDJHVRI/RQGRQUHODWLYHWRRWKHUSDUWVRIWKH8.VXFKDV/RQGRQ¶VSRVLWLRQDVRQHRI
the largest financial centres in the world, and its transport links with major cities worldwide etc.) there is 
clear evidence that London (and indeed the South East of England) already has an in-built competitive 
advantage over not only Scotland but also other parts of the UK. Scotland needs the lever of corporate 
tax to consider a wider array oI RSWLRQV WKDQ LV FXUUHQWO\ WKH FDVH WR KHOS DGGUHVV WKLV LPEDODQFH´
Scottish Government (2011), p34. 
5. Using our model to consider whether differences in corporation taxes across nations can 
offset the impacts of natural geography 
7KH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶VOLQHRIDUJXPHQWDVTXRWHGDERYHVHHPVWRYLHZ6FRWODQG¶VJHRJUDSKLFDO
disadvantage as derived both from its smaller size and its peripheral location. These characteristics are 
FDSWXUHG LQRXUPRGHOZKLFKGRHV LQGHHGVXJJHVW WKDW6FRWODQG¶VQDWXUDO JHRgraphy means Scotland 
has less chance than (parts of) England in attracting foreign direct investment from firms wanting to 
serve consumers across Europe as a whole. 
2IFRXUVHWKHUHDUHPDQ\RWKHUIDFWRUVDVLGHIURPFRUSRUDWLRQWD[WKDWLQIOXHQFHILUPV¶ORFDWLRQFKRLFHV
Our stylised model abstracts from these other factors by assuming nations have identical wage rates, 
skills bases, infrastructures and regulatory environments and differ only in terms of their relative size and 
position within the region.  This means that we cannot hope to compare and contrast the use of 
FRUSRUDWLRQ WD[ ZLWK RWKHU OHYHUV WKDW JRYHUQPHQWV KDYH DYDLODEOH WR WKHP WR LQIOXHQFH ILUPV¶ ORFDtion 
decisions.  
In order to use our stylised model to explore the incentive for an independent Scotland to deviate from 
the corporation tax regime of the rest of the UK we assume that each national government has as its 
goal maximisation of the welfare of its households. Inward foreign direct investment is then attractive 
because local production confers higher social benefits than imports. 
We show that, relative to the location decisions made when taxes are equal, a geographically 
disadvantaged nation whose government reduces corporation tax will attract more firms and that this will 
partially offset the impact of its natural geography.  Of course, any nation that follows a tax-cutting 
strategy such as that proposed by the Scottish Government must expect retaliation. However, our 
analysis demonstrates that when the tax cutting nation is sufficiently small, the retaliation does not 
involve matching the extent of the tax cut in full, given that the other nations retain their advantages of 
size and centrality. +HQFHDQ\µUDFHWRWKHERWWRP¶LVOLNHO\WREHOLPLWHGZLWKWKHUHVXOWWKDWWKHUHLVDQHW
improvement in the attractiveness Scotland to inward investors. Nevertheless, there is a trade-off to be 
made between attracting more firms through reducing corporation tax, and accruing less corporation tax 
revenues.  
 
 
Conclusions  
In this article we have summarised our ongoing research using a stylised model to gain a clearer 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRI WKH LPSDFWRIQDWXUDOJHRJUDSK\RQILUPV¶ORFDWLRQGHFLVLRQV :HKDYHHxplained the 
set-up of our model and have outlined a number of insights. We then went on to describe how we have 
explored the incentives for national governments change corporation tax. We found that corporation tax 
can be an effective lever for a small nation to mitigate some impacts of geographic disadvantage, and 
attract more inward investment. Nonetheless there is likely to be a trade-off between attracting more 
firms and accruing less tax revenue.  
Our research in this area is continuing. In particular, we are seeking to draw insights on how a possible 
future decision to allow different corporation tax regimes across devolved administrations within the UK 
might impact on the welfare of each nation, as well as that of the UK as a whole.  
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